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Can a government infringe upon a work dedicated to the
memory of its people? The February 2010 Federal Circuit decision
Gaylord v. United States addresses that question, but any satisfaction
from the decision presupposes that the government should be held
liable for such an infringement. Consistent with the 1976 Copyright
Act, the Gaylord decision preserves the author's rights, paying no
regard to the identity of the audience or the infringer. From a policy
perspective, however, the result is dubious. Arguably, if a work is a
public memorial, and paid for with public funds, it should
immediately enter the public domain.
This Article focuses on one of the first, easy steps toward an
expansion of the public domain: a policy decision that copyrights for
creative works intended for the public are inherently unenforceable.
Using Gaylord as an example, the Article examines expectations
regarding the copyright of national monuments and memorials, as well
as ownership of that copyright. It considers rights applicable to
memorials, both under § 106 of the Copyright Act and § 106A, the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). It questions whether these works
should be categorized as works of the United States government or,
alternatively, as architectural works, and whether either answer would
run afoul of the Berne Convention. Ultimately, it offers a solution
under fair use that would create room in the public domain-not only
for national monuments and memorials-but any work intended to
belong to the public, for the public to use freely.
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In February 2010, the Federal Circuit decided Gaylord v.
United States, a copyright infringement case regarding the federal
government's derivative use of the Korean War Memorial.' The
United States Postal Service (USPS) had issued a stamp depicting The
Column, a set of nineteen statues making up part of the Korean War
Memorial, but had failed to secure the consent of the sculptor whom
the federal government had commissioned to create the work.2 The
Court of Federal Claims had held the stamp to be a fair use of the
work, deeming the stamp transformative in purpose and finding the
remaining fair use factors-nature of the copyrighted work, amount of
the original work used, and effect on the copyrighted work's
marketplace-to be unpersuasive. 3 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
had the opportunity to declare that national memorials and other
works dedicated to the public are meant for public consumption, freely
allowing the public to use works dedicated to the United States'
national heritage.
Instead, the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of damages to
the copyright owner, finding that the federal government had indeed
infringed a national monument.4 The appellate court reversed the
1. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 1368.
3. Id. at 1373.
4. Id. at 1381.
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ruling of fair use based on the Court of Federal Claims'
misinterpretation of what makes a work transformative, but did not
expand upon the remaining three factors beyond a cursory treatment.
Without the fair use defense, concluded the Federal Circuit, the
government had made an unauthorized derivative work of The
Column, thus incurring liability.5
From a private rights perspective, the decision was correct.
The USPS infringed upon the author's rights by not procuring a
license before using a photograph-itself an unauthorized derivative
work-of The Column. The author owned the copyright and duly
registered it with the Copyright Office. The USPS admitted that its
stamp incorporated the copyrighted work.6 As the Copyright Act
decrees that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner is an infringer, finding the USPS liable for
infringement was the only logical result absent fair use, a valid
license, or some other defense.7 This decision, however, produces a
lingering dissatisfaction rooted not in traditional principles of
copyright, but in traditional notions of the public domain-that which
encompasses "intellectual elements that are not protected by copyright
or whose protection has lapsed, due to the expiration of the duration
for protection."8 The national memorial, created with taxpayer money,
seems to be the prototypical "public work" for this designation under
copyright law.
This Article focuses on one of the first, easy steps toward an
expansion of the public domain: a declaration that works intended for
the public have copyrights that are inherently unenforceable. Part I
explains why a memorial or monument presents the archetypal
example of a work protectable by copyright but intended for the public
domain. Part II details the problems that enforcing that copyright
presents, examining Gaylord as an example. Part III offers ways to
create room in the public domain for those works, limiting the
monopoly the author can exert over the copyright once he has
acknowledged the public nature of the work. Part IV recognizes
obstacles to these solutions, including VARA and the Berne
5. Id. A "derivative work" is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
6. Id. § 1371; Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1371.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
8. Pamela Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAw 7-21 (Lucie Guibalt & P.
Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). Samuelson notes that the definition may be broader, "welcoming
in its ambit uses of works still protected by copyright, but legitimized through the operation of
an exception or of a license." Id.
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Convention. Finally, Part V offers insight for extending the
application of laws applying to monuments and memorials to other
works intended for the public domain, such as Twitter tweets.
I. MONUMENTS, MEMORIALS, AND MONOPOLIES
A monument is "something set up to keep alive the memory of
a person or event, as a tablet, statue, pillar, building, etc."9 The
Washington Monument, for example, was erected to memorialize
George Washington.' 0 Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia, is
composed of several large statues, mainly commemorating Civil War
generals." Similarly, a memorial is "anything made or done in
memory of some person or event."12 The nation's capital is populated
with memorials honoring great leaders, remembering fallen heroes,
and acknowledging significant events: the Jefferson Memorial, the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the Marine Corps War Memorial
(perhaps better known as the Iwo Jima Memorial), as but a few
examples.13 Memorials and monuments are also frequently erected on
a smaller scale; cemeteries nationwide are replete with personal
tributes to individual lives.
Because monuments and memorials exist to "help people
remember," or, "keep alive the memory,"14 many are erected on a
larger scale, seemingly better to achieve the purpose of imprinting
themselves on viewers' memories. The Monument of African
Renaissance, for example, stands at 164 feet tall (higher than the
Statue of Liberty) on the coast of Senegal and can be seen from miles
away.15 Berlin's Holocaust Memorial, Memorial to the Murdered Jews
of Europe, occupies four city blocks of space and can be seen by
9. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 934 (4th ed. 2004).
10. See, e.g., Washington Monument, NAT'L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/wamo/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
11. See, e.g., Monument Avenue Historic District, NAT'L HISTORIC LANDMARKS
PROGRAM, http://tps.cr.nps.gov/nhl/detail.cfm?Resourceld=-1209891467&ResourceType=District
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011). The most recent addition to Monument Avenue, and the only African-
American addition, is Arthur Ashe. Id.
12. WEBSTER'S, supra note 9 at 898.
13. As an example, the website dcMemorials.com lists more than five hundred persons
with statues dedicated to them in Washington, D.C.. Subject Index, DCMEMORIALS.COM,
http://www.dcmemorials.com/index-subject.htm (last visited May 11, 2011).
14. Id. at 898, 934.
15. Annie Look, Senegal's Colossal Statue Stirs Big Controversy, GLOBALPOST (May 30,




satellite.16 Napoleon designed his massive tomb and its home in
Paris's Les Invalides, purely as a memorial to his life.17
If it were not for their nature of perpetuating memory, the
question of what property rights creators enjoy in monuments and
memorials would be (and may still be) a foregone conclusion.
Generally, individual artists or architects are responsible for the
design of the work, which is usually protectable as intellectual
property. At first glance, it would appear this should end the inquiry.
But there is a tension, albeit subtle, that persists. When a memorial
of public events or people is created for the public and supported by
public funds, the communal element to the work challenges the idea
that private rights to later uses of the work should subsist. In other
words, although legally one can recognize that a federal memorial is
the type of work that ordinarily would be subject to intellectual
property protection, policy interests might lead one to question if those
rights do in fact trump that norm.
A. Copyrighting Memory
As the monument is a creative work and an artist is a legal
"author,"18 if a work is protectable, that protection would primarily fall
under copyright law.19 Courts have long deemed three-dimensional
art, such as statutes and sculptures, copyrightable. In 1954, the
Supreme Court in the seminal case Mazer v. Stein first held
"statuettes" copyrightable, although the 1909 Copyright Act did not
enumerate such items. 20 The 1976 Copyright Act expressly includes
16. See, e.g., Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, SATELLITE SIGHTS (Apr. 4,
2008), http://www.satellitesights.com/satelliteimage/Memorial totheMurderedJews-of
EuropejBerlin Germany.
17. Although the tomb itself is huge, it is placed on a story beneath the public entrance
to Les Invalides, so members of the public must bow their heads to acknowledge Napoleon in his
tomb. See, e.g., H6tel National Des Invalides and Napoleon's Tomb, PLACESINFRANCE.COM,
http://www.placesinfrance.com/lesinvalidesnapoleons-tomb.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
18. According to 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006), copyright in a work "protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work." The Copyright Act fails to define what an
"author" is, but as this article refers to creators of "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works," as
specified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5), it is safe to assume that the creator of an otherwise
copyrightable sculptural work is in fact an author for purposes of the Copyright Act.
19. Of course, if a monument or memorial achieves identifying significance, then it is
possible that the work is also protected under trademark law for that particular use. See, e.g.,
Annette Lesieutre Honan, Comment, The Skyscraping Reach of the Lanham Act: How Far
Should the Protection of Famous Building Design Trademarks Be Extended?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1509 (2000). But see Rock & Roll Hall of Fame Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th
Cir. 1998) (reversing a motion for summary judgment protecting the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame
Museum on Lanham Act grounds).
20. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) ('"[Works of art' and 'reproductions of
works of art' are terms that were intended by Congress to include the authority to copyright
2011] 511
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"sculptural works," erasing any ambiguity. 21  Additionally, the
Copyright Office has accorded copyright protection to memorials. For
example, Frank Gaylord, the sculptor and legal author of The Column,
received more than a dozen different copyright registrations for
various aspects of his rendering of foot soldiers for the Korean War
Memorial.22 Felix de Weldon, who used the famous photograph
Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima to create a sculpture of Marines raising
the U.S. flag during the Battle of Iwo Jima, received a copyright
registration for the resulting memorial. 23 These registrations will last
for the life of each respective author, plus seventy years. 24
Copyright law, however, does not afford protection to all three-
dimensional memorials. The Mount Soledad Cross-formerly the
Easter Cross-is unsurprisingly a cross-shaped structure in San
Diego, California, formed of several connected rectangles, giving the
figure an almost hollow look. The Mount Soledad Cross was erected in
1954 to commemorate the Korean War, and ebony plaques honoring
and memorializing individual military members decorate its base.25
But the cross structure itself may lack the originality required to
satisfy the Copyright Act. According to § 102(a), to receive copyright
protection, a work must be an original work of authorship and must be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 26 In turn, originality
requires independent creation and a minimal amount of creativity. 27
Although the level of creativity is not high, a basic shape such as a
cross, square, or sphere may not rise to a level acceptable for
protection under § 102(a). 28 Only if the statue reaches this creativity
these statuettes. Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow
or rigid concept of art.").
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). According to 17 U.S.C. § 101, "'Pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works' include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and
applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models,
and technical drawings, including architectural plans."
22. See infra text accompanying note 69.
23. See, e.g., MARINES RAISING FLAG ON IWO-JIMA, Registration No.
VAu000265428.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 302.
25. Ultimately the copyrightability of the Mount Soledad Cross is a moot point, as the
Ninth Circuit found the memorial to be a violation of the First Amendment prohibition against
the establishment of religion. For more information, see Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d
1099 (9th Cir. 2011).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Because the subjects of this Article would necessarily be fixed in
a tangible medium of expression, I am not addressing that particular point. I can foresee an
instance in which a piece of performance art is dedicated to the memory of a particular person or
event. I consider that outside the scope of this particular article, but would welcome a dialogue
on that particular point.
27. Feist Publ'g Co. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
28. While I recognize that 102(b) also governs the copyrightability of a work, it seems
unlikely that a sculptural monument or memorial would be composed entirely of an "idea,
[Vol. 13:3:507512
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threshold does the author of the work receive copyright protection
upon its completion. 29
B. Owning Memory
It seems counterintuitive that one can be liable for the
copyright infringement of monuments and memorials. After all,
public monuments (or any large piece of sculpture displayed on public
grounds) become part of the landscape and the public consciousness.
One can hardly imagine New York Harbor without the Statue of
Liberty, Daley Plaza in Chicago without the Picasso, 30 or the banks of
the Potomac River without the Iwo Jima Memorial. Yet these works
are subject to copyright, and their authors can receive registrations
from the Copyright Office.31 Frank Gaylord, whose work on The
Column is discussed below, received twelve copyright registrations on
those works. 32
Although copyright protection clearly attaches to a work, it is
often unclear to whom that copyright belongs. If the federal
government creates the monument or memorial, ownership of a
copyright may not be possible; ownership of copyright is statutorily
disfavored for government works. According to § 105 of the Copyright
Act, "copyright protection ... is unavailable for any work of the United
States Government."33 This provision extends to works that are
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. §
102(b). To the extent that a memorial commemorates a discovery, clearly, the idea of a
monument or memorial commemorating such an event would not be subject to copyright.
Otherwise, for example, the bronze head of George Washington at George Washington
University might risk infringing the Washington Monument based on idea alone.
29. See id. § 302, providing that copyright protection subsists from its creation.
30. The Cubist sculpture, dedicated on August 15, 1967, stands at fifty feet tall and
weighs 162 tons. 1967 August 15 Picasso Statue Unveiled in Civic Center Plaza, CHICAGO PUB.
LIBRARY, http://web.archive.org/web/20060831142953/http://www.chipublib.org/004chicago/time
line/picasso.html (last updated Aug. 1997).
31. For instance, Felix de Weldon received Registration Number VAu000265428 on
August 20, 1993, listing 1986 as the date of creation. MARINES RAISING FLAG ON IWO-JIMA,
Registration No. VAuOO0265428. Interestingly, DeWeldon did not credit Joe Rosenthal, who took
the iconic photograph Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima, as a preexisting work in his copyright
registration. Joe Rosenthal, Photographer at Iwo Jima, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/business/media/22rosenthalcnd.html.
32. See infra note 69.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 105(a). A "work of the United States Government" is "a work prepared
by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person's official
duties." 17 U.S.C. § 101. This is not necessarily a problem that is shared by works of state
governments; corresponding federal prohibitions against state government ownership of
copyright do not exist. But see Skinner v. MicroDecisions, Inc., 546 U.S. 1033 (2005) (noting that
the Florida state legislature had enacted authorization to the Department of the Lottery and
universities to hold copyrights, but made no such grant to property appraisers in the course of
their official duties). For purposes of this section, discussion will be limited to federal memorials.
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created by governmental employees in the scope of their employment34
but not to works commissioned by the federal government. 35 To the
extent that an employee of the U.S. government creates a national
monument, therefore, it would not be capable of being protected by
copyright laws.
Neither would a work treated as a "work made for hire" qualify
for copyright protection. If a work of authorship is considered a work
made for hire, the employer is deemed the author and owns the rights
of copyright in the work. 36 Works made for hire encompass works
created by employees as well as works created by non-employees with
the understanding that the employer will own the copyright when the
work is finished. Specifically, a work made for hire is a work:
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test,
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire."
3 7
Sculptures are outside the statutory purview of this definition,
and Supreme Court precedent further suggests that without a
contractual stipulation, sculptures are presumptively not works made
for hire. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,38 the
sculptor created a work for the Community for Creative Non-Violence,
which then wished to move the sculpture to different locations. 39 The
Supreme Court considered various aspects of the work, including who
supplied the materials for the work, who hired help for the work, and
whether the organization paid taxes for the sculptor. 40 These factors
helped illuminate whether the relationship was truly one of employer-
employee, which the statute suggests is necessary for work-made-for-
hire status. 41  Ultimately, weighing these factors, the Court
determined that the sculptor was an independent contractor. 42 In
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "work of the United States government").
35. See, e.g., M.B. Schnapper Pub. Affairs Press v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(finding nothing in § 105 precludes a private copyright even if works were to be funded by the
government).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . .. and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.").
37. Id. § 101.
38. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
39. The statue, Third World America, depicted a modern holy family huddled around a
street grate, homeless. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 733.
40. Id. at 752.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
42. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752.
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other words, while the Court did not require a contractual provision
for the work to be considered a work made for hire, the evidence had
to be strongly in favor of an employer-employee relationship. 43 A
payment would not suffice. As a result, the sculptor may receive a
copyright in his work, despite adequate compensation from the entity
commissioning the work.
Since many monuments and memorials are sculptures, CCNV
is instructive for protecting government works. Even if the federal
government did commission a sculpture intended to be a federal
monument, it probably would not be considered a work made for hire,
absent a contractual provision declaring it as such. Since a contract
must be in place to grant the government ownership rights in the
work, it would make sense also to assign the government all rights in
the copyrighted work at that time, bypassing the work-made-for-hire
analysis altogether. After all, even though the government cannot
author a copyrightable work outright, it can own a copyright assigned
to it.44 Nevertheless, there are two problems inherent in relying upon
contract to cure copyright's ills. First, regardless of the federal actors,
contracts rely on various state laws and courts for interpretation and
validity. 45 Second, and perhaps more important, reliance on contract
law ignores human fallibility. Unless Congress implements some
statutory mechanism to assign the work automatically, it is entirely
likely that some contracts could fail to pass judicial muster, or they
may simply not be executed beforehand due to mere negligence.
Thus, the conundrum for the memorial continues. The federal
government is unable to author a copyrighted federal work, and
perhaps it will not receive the copyright of the work through
assignment.46 In the case of a memorial, a private artist could very
well create the work and then receive the copyright in addition to the
compensation the government grants. The funding for that
compensation, in turn, comes from taxes on citizens, who are also the
intended beneficiaries of such memorials. Ironically, if the
government commissions a work to benefit the American public, and
some American uses that work for his own benefit-which he might
feel entitled to do, having helped pay for the work-he may be held
responsible for infringing it.
43. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752-753.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 ("[T]he United States Government is not precluded from
receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.").
45. See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[A][2]
(1994) ("Because contractual rights arise under state law, jurisdiction lies solely with the state
courts in an action to enforce contracts relating to works subject to statutory copyright or rights
under those contracts.").
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 and discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
2011] 515
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C. Copying Memory
The Copyright Act identifies acts of copyright infringement
primarily as violations of the exclusive rights set out under §§ 106 and
106A. 4 7  An author of a statue or sculpture receives certain rights
under § 106, but only two of the § 106 rights practically apply to
statues or memorials. 48 First, § 106 grants the author the exclusive
right to reproduce his work. 4 9 A person, therefore, cannot make an
exact copy of a statue and claim ownership of the copyright therein.
Second, § 106 conveys the right to make derivative works, which
include adaptations and translations.5 0 Only the author has the right
to create works incorporating the original work, and as a result, it is
an infringement for a person to use that underlying work to make
another work.5 1 In the case of a sculpture, for example, copyright law
would prohibit a person from taking a photograph, selling a miniature
replica, or creating a two-dimensional drawing without license from
the author.52
As authors of visual works of art, sculptors also enjoy rights
under the Visual Artists' Rights Act (VARA).53 First, VARA gives the
author the right of attribution-the right to be associated with and
known as the author of the work.54 Second, the author has the right of
integrity, which is the right "to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation ... and to prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature."55 Like the rights afforded
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
48. See id. § 106. The remaining rights, although included in the grant of copyright,
seem ill suited for the owner of a copyright in a memorial. The right to distribute would scarce
apply, since a memorial is by nature a single work that is created not for purposes of resale. The
right to display is subsumed in the transfer of the physical work to the government. The right to
perform does not apply to a statue by the nature of the work, and per § 106, the right to perform
digitally applies only to sound recordings.
49. Id.
50. See id. § 101.
51. See id. §§ 106, 501(a).
52. Additionally, in the case of memorials incorporating names or other text, such as the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, even a simple rubbing would infringe the underlying copyrighted
work.
53. See 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(1)-(2) ("[The author of a work of visual art shall have the
right to claim authorship of that work, and to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
any work of visual art which he or she did not create; shall have the right to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.").
54. See id. § 106A.
55. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B). For example, in Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art
Found., Inc. v. BUchel, 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010), artist Christoph Biichel conceived a football-
field-sized art installation to be exhibited at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art.
516
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under § 106, VARA rights are also limited. For example, the First
Circuit in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate held that an author does
not have the right to include the site of the work as part of the
"integrity" of the work of art,5 6 so the work can be moved if needed.
Unlike § 106 rights, however, § 106A rights are not transferable.
These moral rights, such as identity and reputation, are considered
personal to the author and thus incapable of assignment. 7 As a
result, as VARA currently reads, even if the author were to transfer
the rights under § 106 to the government, rights of attribution and
integrity would remain with the author.
II. GAYLORD V. UNITED STATES
The practical implications of granting copyrights for public
memorials were highlighted last year in the Federal Circuit, which
determined that the federal government could infringe its own
memorial. Gaylord dealt with The Column, a group of statues
sculpted by Frank Gaylord as part of the Korean War Memorial on the
National Mall in Washington, D.C.5 8 The Column is comprised of
nineteen larger-than-life statues of ponchoed U.S. soldiers depicted
walking through rice fields in the Korean War. Gaylord constructed
the statues of clay and then stainless steel,59 placing them in a
triangular pattern on a green field lined with reflective granite,
evocative of water. 60
In 2002, the USPS issued a stamp depicting The Column in
winter.61 This stamp was based on the photograph Real Life taken by
Id. at 41. Bichel was dissatisfied with how the Museum implemented his instructions and
procured items necessary for the installation, and ultimately the project lapsed. Id. at 44-45.
After announcing the cancellation of the project, the Museum opened Bichel's exhibit, though
most of the work had been by Museum employees. Id. at 45. The court found that VARA applied
to the work, however, genuine disputes of material facts foreclosed summary judgment on
Bichel's claim that the Museum violated his right of artistic integrity by modifying his
installation. Id. at 62-66.
56. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 2006) ("By
concluding that VARA applies to site-specific art, and then allowing the removal of site-specific
art pursuant to the public presentation exception, the district court purports to protect site-
specific art under VARA's general provisions, and then permit its destruction by the application
of one of VARA's exceptions. To us, this is not a sensible reading of VARA's plain meaning.
Either VARA recognizes site-specific art and protects it, or it does not recognize site-specific art
at all.").
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) ("The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be
transferred, but those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a
written instrument signed by the author.").
58. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
59. Id.
60. From the author's personal observations.
61. Id. at 1370.
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John Alli, who subsequently selected that photo for use in a collection
of photographs as a retirement gift for his father, a Korean War
veteran.62 Alli wanted to sell prints of Real Life and sought the owner
of the copyright for permission, securing a license from architectural
firm Cooper-Lecky. 63
U.S. postage stamp "Korean War Veterans Memorial"'64
How Cooper-Lecky and Gaylord became involved with the
creation of the Korean War Memorial is interesting, if not exactly
straightforward. Congress enacted legislation "to erect a memorial in
Washington, D.C. to honor veterans of the Korean War" in 1986.65
The American Battle Monuments Commission sponsored a contest,
and a team from Penn State University submitted the winning idea.6 6
The Penn State team eventually withdrew, and the Army Corps of
Engineers hired Cooper-Lecky for the "creation, construction, and
installation" of the memorial.67 Cooper-Lecky then held a contest to
find a sculptor for the idea proposed by Penn State, and ultimately
selected Frank Gaylord. 68 With input from Cooper-Lecky and the
Veterans' Administration, Gaylord finished The Column and
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370-71.






registered multiple copyrights of various aspects the work with the
Copyright Office as its sole author.69
Gaylord received $775,000 for the completion of The Column. 70
The USPS, which paid Alli $1,500 for use of his photograph, did not
compensate Gaylord.71 Nearly 48 million stamps were sold, resulting
in total sales of $17 million. 72 Gaylord sued the USPS in 2006, and
the Court of Federal Claims determined the government's use of the
memorial to be fair use, transformative of The Column.73
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
fair use finding on transformative grounds, and, giving cursory
attention to the remaining three fair use factors, found that fair use
did not apply.7 4 Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that The
Column was neither a joint work of authorship, permitting the
architects to license rights,75 nor an architectural work exempting the
work from infringement.76 As a result, the Federal Circuit remanded
the case to the Court of Federal Claims for a determination of
damages."7
In dissent, Judge Newman relied primarily relied on an
argument grounded in statute. The provision 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b)
permits a copyright holder to sue the United States, but withholds
that right "with respect to any copyrighted work prepared by a person
while in the employment or service of the United States . . . or in the
preparation of which Government time, material, or facilities were
69. Taken in order, the copyright registrations tell an interesting progression over the
years of the project: KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL SKETCH MODELS, Registration No.
VAu000187193 (sculptures); THE COLUMN, Registration No. VAuoo0228439 (19 sculptures);
KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL SKETCH COMPOSITION, Registration No. VAu000206990
(sculpture); KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL SKETCH NO. 2, Registration No. VAu000207794
(sculpture); 3 PONCHO SKETCH MAQUETTES, 19 PONCHO SKETCH SOLDIERS,
Registration No. VAuOO0214488 (sculptures); COLUMN HEAD STUDIES, Registration No.
VAuO00214489 (sculptures); THE COLUMN, Registration No. VAu000306934 (19 sculptures);
THE COLUMN, Registration No. VAu000237832 (sculpture); THE COLUMN, Registration No.
VAuoo0280954 (19 clay sculptures); THE COLUMN, Registration No. VAu000280955 (sketch
models for National Korean War Veterans Memorial); and THE COLUMN, Registration No.
VAu000342493 (new matter: stainless steel casting with some sculptural revisions). Only one
copyright registration, NATIONAL KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL, Registration No.
VAu000447698, lists additional authors Louis Nelson, W. Kent Cooper, and William P. Lecky.
70. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1383.
71. Id. at 1371.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1371-73. Fair uses of a copyrighted work, discussed at length infra, are not
considered to be infringement, but instead a preservation of the constitutional freedom of speech
in areas such as comment, criticism, and news reporting. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011).
74. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372-76.
75. Id. at 1376-80.
76. Id. at 1380-81.
77. Id. at 1381.
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used."78 Clearly, noted Judge Newman, The Column fell into such a
category, and artists should not be permitted to sue the U.S.
Government for copyright infringement of works done "in the service
of the United States.79 Judge Newman advanced the supporting policy
argument as well:
The Korean War Veterans Memorial is a work of public art and a national monument.
It was authorized by Congress, installed on the National Mall, and paid for by
appropriated funds . . . . [The majority] holding is contrary to the contract provisions,
contrary to statute for works done in the service of the United States, contrary to
copyright law, and contrary to national policy governing access to public monuments.
8 0
She reemphasized this position several times in her opinion, stating:
"The use for governmental purposes of a photograph of the Korean
War Veterans Memorial, a public monument that was designed and
built with public money, is unambiguously covered by the contract and
statutes under which this Memorial was built."81
The Gaylord decision and Judge Newman's dissent highlight
the problem inherent in public memorials and monuments.
Statutorily speaking, a copyright owner such as Frank Gaylord has
every right to enforce his copyright. If his work is not "made for hire"
(because it fails the test of CCNV), then a presumption arises that it
was also not performed "in service of the United States." Legally,
nothing prevents the creator of a public memorial or monument from
enforcing the copyright, even against the United States, which
supplied the funding for the project in the first place.
Even so, applying copyright here feels wrong. From a policy
standpoint, a public memorial or monument belongs to the people. If
the United States or one of its citizens creates a derivative work of
that public memorial or monument, then we may presume that the
derivative work reflects a work already in the public domain-not due
to passage of time, but to the public nature of the work.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR "PUBLIC WORKS"
The solution may be in the play on words that describes what
these monuments and memorials are: public works. "Public works"
are "works (as schools, highways, docks) constructed for public use or
enjoyment especially when financed and owned by the government." 82
Given that public memorials or monuments are generally constructed
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2010).
79. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1381.
81. Id. at 1386 (emphasis added).
82. Public Works, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
public%20works (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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for public use and enjoyment and are financed and owned by the
government, it makes sense that those works could be classified as
public works as well. But, as our intellectual property system
establishes, ownership of the work does not necessarily mean
ownership of the copyright.83
In the case of these public and government works, however, it
should. There are several ways to achieve government ownership of
the copyright, or at least, treatment of the work as if it were in the
public domain. First, Congress could amend the relevant statutes to
specify that works created for the public remain in the public domain
and cannot be infringed. Congress could do this either by amending
§ 10184 to extend the definition of "work of the United States"
specifically to include commissioned works as works of the United
States Government under § 105, or by amending the definition of
"architectural works" under § 101 to treat monuments and memorials
as architectural works under § 120.85 Second, Congress could add a
category of intellectual property outside the traditional parameters of
copyright to include works of cultural importance that automatically
enter the public domain, basing the legislation on similar enactments
passed in other countries, such as Egypt.86 Third, and perhaps most
pragmatically, courts could guard the public domain by incorporating
into the interpretation of fair use-specifically, the nature of the
copyrighted work-an element of the author's intended use for the
work. This would create a flexible case-by-case approach to perceived
infringement while strengthening the position of the public domain
with respect to these works.
A. Solutions within the Copyright Act
First, Congress could amend the Copyright Act to limit the
rights copyrights provide for authors. Ostensibly, the authors would
still receive copyright in these works; however, the scope and the
enforcement of their copyrights would be sharply defined by the
amendments to the Copyright Act itself. The most practical
amendments would be to § 105 and § 101 to the definition of "works of
the U.S. Government," and possibly to § 120 and § 101 for
"architectural works."
83. See, e.g., Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (defining "work of the United States Government").
85. See id. §§ 101, 105, 120.
86. See, e.g., Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities), 11 Aug. 1983
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1. Sections 105 and 101: Works of the U.S. Government
As noted above, § 105 prevents the federal government from
receiving copyrights in the works it creates: "Copyright protection
under this title is not available for any work of the United States
Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from
receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment,
bequest, or otherwise." 7
Section 101 defines a "work of the United States Government"
as "a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person's official duties."88 Courts have
interpreted §§ 105 and 101 to deny protection to federal statutes and
regulations,89 internal Central Intelligence Agency reports,90 military
ranks and insignia,91 and printed versions of Congressional hearings.92
However, § 105 "is not necessarily subverted by assigning to the
Government the copyright in a commissioned work that is neither
produced by current or former employees nor related to the official
duties of any Government employee;" 93 therefore, commissioned works
do not automatically fall within the ambit of § 105.
Section 105 does not grant the United States copyright in
works of the U.S. Government, but instead, places such works directly
into the public domain:
The effect of section 105 is intended to place all works of the United States Government,
published or unpublished, in the public domain. This means that the individual
Government official or employee who wrote the work could not secure copyright in it or
restrain its dissemination by the Government or anyone else, but it also means that, as
far as the copyright law is concerned, the Government could not restrain the employee
or official from disseminating the work if he or she chooses to do so. The use of the term
87. Id. § 105.
88. Id. § 101.
89. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l., Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 2002)
("Significantly, the 1976 Copyright Act specifically denies protection to federal statutes and
regulations.").
90. See Pfeiffer v. C.I.A., 60 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Pfeiffer, the plaintiff had
worked for the C.I.A. for years, and when he left the agency, he took with him a copy of the
unedited version of a Bay of Pigs report. Id. at 863. While the court held that he was correct in
that no governmental copyright protection existed over the report, the report still rightfully
remained in the possession of the United States Government. Id. at 864-65.
91. See Faessler v. U.S. Playing Card Co., No. 1:05CV581, 2007 WL 490171, at *10 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 9, 2007).
92. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 723 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that Pardon of Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 90-151
(1974), was a "work of the United States Government" and not copyrightable), rev'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
93. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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"work of the United States Government" does not mean that a work falling within the
definition of that term is the property of the U.S. Government.
9 4
A simple phrase added to the definition of "work of the United
States Government" could eliminate the problem that a work
commissioned by the U.S. government presents. For example, adding
"or commissioned by the United States Government" at the end of the
§ 101 definition would mean that works commissioned by the
government, such as The Column, would be precluded from copyright
protection.
This solution is not without drawbacks. First, such an
amendment may provide a disincentive to those who would create
memorials for the government in the first place. If authors could not
receive a copyright, perhaps there would be less motivation for
authors to serve their government by creating memorials without the
right to profit further. This argument, while valid, should not hinder
change. First, under a properly executed contractual arrangement,
most authors would not retain the copyright in the work regardless of
whether the definition is amended to encompass commissioned works.
Second, lack of copyright does not mean lack of compensation. As
noted earlier, Frank Gaylord received $775,000 for his work on The
Column.95 Additionally, while lack of copyright may provide a deal-
breaker for established, well-known artists, burgeoning artists may
not mind relinquishing a copyright as long as they retain rights of
attribution.
Second, the elimination of moral rights for these government
works under § 106A, in addition to copyrights under § 106, would
cause further problems. Because Congress added § 106A to the
Copyright Act in 1990,96 Congress did not initially draft all provisions
of the Copyright Act with moral rights in mind.97 Current works of
the U.S. government under § 105 do not enjoy VARA rights and are
not copyrightable; however, most of the works of the U.S. government,
because they are not works of visual art, do not qualify for VARA
rights in the first place.98 If § 101 is to be amended to include
government-commissioned works as "works of the United States
Government," then an amendment should be made to § 106A to note
94. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 58-60 (1976).
95. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
96. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (1990)
[hereinafter VARA].
97. VARA did encompass some other sections of the Copyright Act, but not all. For
example, § 107 made express acknowledgement that its provisions applied "[n]otwithstanding
the provisions of sections 106 and 106A." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
98. See id. § 106A.
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that the rights of attribution and integrity remain with an artist,
regardless of the inapplicability of § 106 rights to such works.
Finally, this change would only apply to works created or
commissioned by the federal government, excluding other works also
meant to be public. For example, state or city memorials, unlike
federal monuments, would still be copyrightable. Amending the
definition of "work of the United States Government" is the most
tailored potential solution, if the copyrightability of a federal memorial
is to be solved. However, amending a different section of the
Copyright Act could place more works into the public domain, if that is
the desired outcome.
2. Sections 120 and 101: Scope of Rights in Architectural Works
Another possibility, one which the Gaylord majority
considered, is to classify a work the size of The Column as an
architectural work. Unlike a work of the U.S. government, an
architectural work is eligible for copyright protection, absent work-
specific problems such as inherent uncopyrightability.99  The
provisions in § 120, however, limit the scope of that protection. While
"architectural works" are specifically listed under § 102(a)(8) as works
entitled to copyright protection,100 the Copyright Act provides that
certain activities cannot be enforced as instances of copyright
infringement.101 Section 120(a) provides:
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the
right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings,
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the
work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.1
0 2
In turn, an "architectural work" under § 101 is "the design of a
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including
a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements in the design, but does not include individual standard
features."103
The Gaylord court considered whether it could consider The
99. See id. § 102(a)(8).
100. Id. ("Works of authorship include the following categories: . . . (8) architectural
works.").
101. See id. § 120(a).
102. Id. Section 120(b), which permits owners of a building embodying an architectural
work to make alterations to or destroy a building without the copyright owner's consent, seems
inapplicable for purposes of this article.
103. Id. § 101. In 1990, the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act amended
section 101 by adding the definition for "architectural work." Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
5133 (1990) [hereinafter AWCPA].
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Column to be an architectural work under the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA):
The Government argues that the [Korean War Veterans' Memorial] was designed for
"human occupancy" in a similar manner as museums, gazebos, or garden pavilions and
thus fits within the Copyright Office's definition. To support this argument, Defendant
cites to a passage of AWCPA's legislative history, which indicates that Congress
intended to extend coverage of the AWCPA to structures 'that are used, but not
inhabited, by human beings, such as churches, pergolas, gazebos, and garden
pavilions."'
1 0 4
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, like the Court of Federal
Claims before it, found that the word "building" prevented the court
from treating The Column or the entire memorial as an architectural
work.105 Although Congress may have intended to extend coverage
beyond permanent and stationary structures designed for human
occupancy, it is clear that the Copyright Office does not share that
intent, limiting "buildings" to "humanly habitable structures that are
intended to be both permanent and stationary, such as houses and
offices, and other permanent and stationary structures designed for
human occupancy, including but not limited to churches, museums,
gazebos, and garden pavilions."106 The Copyright Office also excludes
from registration under AWCPA other structures it does not consider
to be buildings, such as walkways and bridges.o10
There are some logical impediments preventing the
consideration of memorials such as The Column as an architectural
work under copyright. Under § 102 of the Copyright Act, "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works" are listed separately from
"architectural" works in the Act's list of works eligible for copyright
protection. 108 Moreover, most large sculptures are incapable of human
habitation and therefore not "buildings" to be included in the § 101
definition.109 It might be problematic simply to lump large sculptures
in as architectural works within the scope of § 120 or the definition of
architectural works under § 101.
Ignoring the semantics, however, the restriction at play in
§ 120 also makes sense for public memorials. The AWCPA excludes
the right to "prevent the making, distributing, or public display of
pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of
the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or
104. Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 71 (Fed. Cl. 2008) ((citing Defs Post Tr. Br.
at 29), (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-173 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951)).
105. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (2011).
107. Id. § 202.11(d)(1).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102(5), (8) (2006).
109. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2).
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ordinarily visible from a public place,"110 because when a building
becomes part of the landscape, it is impossible to represent the
landscape without including the building with it."n The same is true
for sculptures or large memorials. For example, the Washington, D.C.
skyline would be incomplete without the Washington Monument in
the center of the Mall. 112 Likewise, a photograph of the Mall would be
incomplete without the Korean War Veterans' Memorial, including
The Column.
Instead of calling memorials "architectural works," perhaps the
optimal solution is to amend the title of § 120 to include "large
sculptural works" in addition to architectural works. The current title
is, "Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works";11 3 an amendment
could enlarge the reach of the provision to "Scope of exclusive rights in
architectural and public artistic works." Congress could then add a
definition of "public artistic works" that would reflect the definition of
''public works" seen earlier in this section: "Works of authorship
constructed for public use or enjoyment, especially when financed and
owned by the government."
This definition could avoid the situation in Chicago in the mid-
2000s upon installation of the sculpture Cloud Gate, by artist Anish
Kapoor. 1 14  Cloud Gate measures 33 feet by 66 feet by 42 feet and
weighs 110 tons.115 Initially, security guards shooed photographers
away, noting that Cloud Gate was under copyright protection, and
that copyright had been licensed to the City of Chicago. 116 The City
issued permits "priced at $350 a day for professional still
photographers, $1,200 a day for professional videographers and $50
an hour for wedding photographers."11 7 While the City was within its
rights under copyright law to issue the regulations, the public reaction
110. Id. § 120(a).
111. Id.
112. The Washington Monument, completed in 1884, is admittedly outside any possible
scope of copyright. Moreover, because inside the Monument flights of 896 steps surround an
elevator that takes visitors to the observation level, it is even possible that the Washington
Monument could be considered a building. See, e.g., Washington Monument, NAT'L PARK
SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travellwash/dc72.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 120.
114. Chicago Tonight: The Bean Unveiled, (television broadcast May 15, 2006). Cloud
Gate, informally called "the Bean" until Kapoor formally named it, is located in Millennium
Park, which is at the north end of Chicago's Grant Park, alongside Lake Michigan. Id.
115. ROBERT SHAROFF, BETTER THAN PERFECT: THE MAKING OF CHICAGO'S MILLENNIUM
PARK 61 (2004).
116. See, e.g., Charles Storch, Millennium Park Loosens Its Photo Rules, CHICAGO TRIB.,





was largely unfavorable.118 Partially in response to the negative
public reaction to the photographic permits, the City no longer issues
these permits and has appeared to back off of requiring permits to film
Cloud Gate.119
Amending § 120 to permit derivative works in the form of two-
dimensional representations of public works of art could avoid
problems such as this. However, this type of amendment may cover
more than works that the government sponsors. Larger private
works, such as wrapped installations by renowned artists Christo and
Jeanne-Claude, would also be covered by an amendment to this
provision, although the work is a private venture not having
government sponsorship, permanence, or particular significance to the
location.120
B. New Protections to Works
Congress also could amend the Copyright Act by providing for
automatic government ownership of all works of public significance.
This would not mandate automatic entry into the public domain, but it
would require that the U.S. Government, not any private author,
would become the copyright owner of such a work of authorship.121 As
such, the government could decide not to exercise any rights for works
of national significance.
International precedent for this type of proposal exists. In
March 2010, Egypt passed antiquities legislation that nationalized
ownership of any item achieving national significance. 12 2 Specifically,
"each and every property or movable shall be considered an antiquity,"
118. See, e.g., Kelly Kleiman, Who Owns Public Art?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30,
2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0330/pl5sOl-usju.html. Gallery owner Bob Horsch
commented, "We're taxpayers . .. . [w]e've been representing Chicago for 32 years. . . . I don't
care what they say; it's public domain." Id.
119. See Permits for Filming, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/dcalprovdrs/chicago film.office/svcs/permits-for filming.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
120. The artists Christo and Jeanne-Claude are known for large temporary installations
such as Wrapped Monuments, Running Fence, Pont Neuf Wrapped, and The Umbrellas. See
Common Errors, CHRISTO AND JEANNE-CLAUDE, http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/error.shtml
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011). They are emphatic that they are private artists and do not accept
grants for their work. However, they do work with governments for their installations. For
example, for the work Pont Neuf Wrapped, the project director received approval for the work
from authorities of the City of Paris, the Departement of the Seine and the State. The Pont Neuf
Wrapped, CHRISTO AND JEANNE-CLAUDE, http://christojeanneclaude.net/pn.shtml (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011).
121. Although, according to the legislative history of §105, such a provision would
provide direct entry into the public domain. See supra text accompanying note 94.
122. Egyptian Antiquities Law, supra note 86. As the author is writing this article, it is
unclear to what extent the laws of Egypt will remain in place with any new government that will
take the place of the current regime. Still, it remains an interesting precedent.
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if it falls within one of three categories:
(1) A production of the Egyptian or subsequent civilizations or a production of art,
science, literature or religion found on Egypt's land from the pre-historical era up to one
hundred years before the present time.
(2) Of archaeological, artistic or historic value, as it reflects one of the civilizations that
existed in Egypt - whether Egyptian or others.
(3) Created or established in Egypt or has a historic relationship to it. 12 3
At first glance, this modern law covers only very old works, and
not necessarily works that are newly created or works still covered
under the copyright laws of the country. However, the Egyptian
legislation anticipates works that achieve instant national distinction,
providing that "any property, real or movable, of historic, scientific,
religious, artistic, or literary value may. . . be deemed an antiquity, if
the State has a national interest in preserving and maintaining the
same, without observing the [hundred-year] time limit."12 4 This means
that even new works, as long as they possess "historic, scientific,
religious, artistic, or literary value," originate in Egypt, and share a
cultural or historical relationship with Egypt, may be declared state-
owned "antiquities." Though the antiquities become state-owned
properties, the Supreme Council of Antiquities becomes the manager
of all antiquities and receives all intellectual property rights,
trademarks, and exploitation protections, even those for
"archaeological products, photos of the pieces, and the archaeological
sites."125
Similar legislation in the United States could extend to artistic
works intended to be part of the American culture or reflect its history
without entangling current intellectual property laws in the property
analysis for works of national significance. The Column, for example,
could be declared a property of historic or artistic value, and then the
United States would assume intellectual property rights, including
rights of marketing derivative works merely reflecting the works in
paraphernalia sold as souvenir items or as part of the landscape.
This option, of course, has its own drawbacks. Again, there is a
problem when limiting federal-but not state-works. "Antiquity" law
is not an overly developed area in the United States; several disparate
laws protect artifacts and cultural property-not a cohesive body of
law. 126 It seems artificial to add another stopgap in antiquities law to
123. Id. at art. 1.
124. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at art. 36.
126. For example, the protection and control of artifacts is covered by the National Stolen
Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (2006); the protection of art and cultural property of
American indigenous peoples is covered by the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,
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cover works generally covered by copyright. And, if recent attempts at
sui generis protection in Europe are any indication, implementing a
new law to cure a problem just outside of traditional intellectual
property bounds-patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret-rarely
succeeds.127
C. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is another way Congress could work
within the strictures of the Copyright Act to allow more public access
to certain works. A compulsory license allows the copyright owner to
retain the license in a copyrighted work, but mandates that any
person meeting the requirements of the Copyright Act receive a
license to use the work, for a fee.128
One of the most common schemes for compulsory licensing in
the Copyright Act extends to musical works under § 115: "A person
may obtain a compulsory license only if his or her primary purpose in
making phonorecords is to distribute them to the public for private
use."129 The person may not change the "basic melody or fundamental
character" of the work, and the work shall not receive copyright
protection as a derivative of the copyrighted work.o30 The person must
deliver notice of his intention to use the copyrighted work to the
copyright owner, 131 and, upon distribution of the licensed work, must
pay royalties to the copyright owner.132
The problems with a compulsory license scheme for public art
are comparable to problems already apparent in the compulsory
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.; Native American remains and burial goods are covered by the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C §§ 3001-3013 (2006). The U.S.
Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2006), is quite narrow and has been held to be
unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). But see United
States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979); United States v.
Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980) (both allowing the
government to prosecute under the Act).
127. For example, the European Union Database Directive was instituted in Europe in
1996 with the stated purpose of giving European database providers a competitive edge over
their non-European providers. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EC) (on the legal
protection of databases). Ten years later, a commission found that the Directive had failed to
achieve that goal, and was largely ineffective as a piece of intellectual property legislation. DG
Internal Market and Services Working Paper: First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal
Protection of Databases, § 1.1 (Comm'n of European Cmtys., Working Paper Dec. 12, 2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eulinternal market/
copyright/doesidatabases/evaluation report en.pdf.
128. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006).
130. Id. § 115(a)(2).
131. Id. § 115(b)(1).
132. Id. § 115(c).
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license scheme for music. For example, as Professor Jane Ginsburg
notes in connection with music, one concern would be pricing.133 What
is the value of using a work of art, and does that value change if it is a
recognized symbol of the country? Additionally, Ginsburg notes the
difficulty of determining royalty distributions in the music industry.134
At least in a digital medium, technology may allow authors to be
traced and tracked with automatic payment accounts.135 In the world
of fine art, the government would need, for example, to establish an
independent registry, specifying individual works of art eligible for
compulsory licensing, and attempting to locate the address of the
author to provide fees.136
D. Interpretation of Fair Use
A fourth solution involves judicial reinterpretation of fair use
in the Copyright Act. Fair use, found in § 107 of the Copyright Act, is
simultaneously a defense for infringement of copyright and a claim of
non-infringement of copyright.137  Intended to address First
Amendment concerns in the Copyright Act, fair use offers a test by
which to determine whether a later use of a copyrighted work is a
permissible one, as opposed to an infringement of the author's
rights.138 Section 107 sets forth a non-exhaustive list of uses that
might ultimately be deemed fair: "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research."139 Courts consider four factors to determine fair use:
133. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1642-43 (2001).
134. Id. at 1644.
135. See, e.g., Ken Fisher, Universal to Track DRM-Free Music Online via Watermarking,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 16, 2007, 12:05AM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/08/universal-to-
track-drm-free-music-online-via-watermarking. ars.
136. This is not without precedent. In California, the Resale Royalties Act, California
Civil Code Section 986, provides that whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides or
the sale takes place in California, the seller pays to the artist 5 percent of the amount of such
sale. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986(a) (West 2011). The fund is managed by the California Arts Council, a
state agency which has the mission to "advance California through the arts and creativity." See
About the CAC, CALIFORNIA ARTS COUNCIL, http://www.cac.ca.gov/aboutus/aboutus.php (last
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
137. Although 17 U.S.C. § 107 states that the fair use of a copyrighted work "is not an
infringement of copyright," one making fair use of a copyrighted work typically has to raise the
argument of fair use on defense, and the Supreme Court has called it an "affirmative defense."
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)); H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3, n. 3
(1992).
138. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220 (2003) (citing Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 560).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 140
No one factor is dispositive when determining fair use.141
Over time, courts have interpreted the factors on a case-by-case
basis. They have expanded the first factor, for example, to include
transformative uses-those uses that "add[] something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message."142 The Supreme Court has clarified
the third factor, noting it includes copying not only a large amount of
the work, but even a small amount of copying constituting the "heart"
of the work-a qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, amount of
copying. 143 The Supreme Court has found that the fourth factor can
also mean effect on the ability of the copyright owner to license the
copyrighted work. 144
Courts, however, have rarely chosen to expand the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, and some scholars find it
the least significant of the four factors.145 Generally, courts have
viewed the second factor as one resulting from two inquiries: whether
the work is creative and whether the work is published.
First, courts note that if a copyrighted work is creative, any
subsequent use is less likely to be deemed fair.146 The Supreme Court
has noted that "fair use is more likely to be found in factual works
than in fictional works,"1 47 and in original works as opposed to
derivatives. 148 Given the relatively low threshold for creativity in the
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
142. Id. at 579.
143. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
144. Id. at 567-68.
145. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27-28 (1997).
146. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984)
(contrasting all creative works with works of an informational nature). But see M.C.A., Inc. v.
Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the courts may consider whether the work
was "creative, imaginative, and original").
147. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (citing MELVILLE NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] at 13-88).
148. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001)
("[Original, creative works are afforded greater protection than derivative works or factual
compilations.").
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Copyright Act, even among factual works, 149 it is no surprise that the
Supreme Court has found it "not much help" in the fair use
determination.1so Furthermore, where the creative work is used for a
transformative purpose, "the second factor may be of limited
usefulness."15 1
Courts also determine the second factor based on the
publication status of the work. The prototypical case of unfair use of
an unpublished work, Harper & Row Publications v. Nation
Enterprises, considered the unpublished memoirs of President Gerald
R. Ford.152 The Supreme Court found that "the unpublished nature of
a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending
to negate a defense of fair use."1 5 3 Because most works are both
creative and published, one disfavoring fair use and the other
supporting it, the second factor is generally neutral in the four-factor
test.
Nowhere in the fair use analysis do courts consider the author's
intent in creating the copyrighted work. The first factor discusses the
"purpose and character" of the allegedly infringing work, but not what
the original author intended the copyrighted work to convey. This
inquiry is well suited for inclusion in the second factor of fair use; the
"nature of the copyrighted work" could include a simple inquiry as to
what the author intended when he created the work. If the author
intended the work for public use and consumption, such as a national
monument or memorial, it should have a bearing on whether any
purported infringer's activity should be deemed fair. This inquiry
would allow courts to consider on a case-by-case basis whether the
author originally intended the underlying work to be in the public
domain at some time.
Professor Lydia Loren has explored whether an author's intent
should play into the second factor. Instead of intent for the work,
however, Loren examines the motivation for creating the work and its
dissemination.15 4 Loren approaches motivation with an inquiry as to
whether the author intended to profit from the creation and
149. Feist Publ'g Co. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
150. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). The Campbell court did not
comment on the low threshold of copyrightability in its decision, but instead noted that the factor
"calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intellectual property than others,
with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are
copied." Id.
151. Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 619 F.3d 301, 315 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)).
152. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).
153. Id. at 554.
154. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 38 (2008).
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distribution of the work, or if some other factor figured into the
creative calculus the author undertook when deciding whether to
create. 155 For example, Loren hypothesizes:
A court would inquire into the nature of papal decrees and other documents from
churches designed to provide guidance to church members. The creation and
dissemination of such documents, a court would likely conclude, are motivated not by
the market-based incentives that copyright law creates, but by other considerations.
That conclusion should influence the result in a fair use analysis, weighing in favor of
fair use and thus creating a less robust scope of protection for that type of work. 156
Professor Loren's expansion of the second factor is a promising
start to render it more meaningful in a fair use analysis. This
interpretation examines the motivation of the author in creating the
work, but in the end, the author's motivation to create is a separate
inquiry from the intended use of the work itself. As an example,
Frank Gaylord received $775,000 for creating The Column.157 When
he created it, however, he understood that the sculpture would be part
of a national memorial. As a result, the author's economic motivation
need not match his intention for use.
Expansion of the second factor does not mean that courts would
automatically find fair use. The Gaylord court, for example,
considered each of the four factors when determining that the USPS's
use was not fair. 15 8 The crux of the Federal Circuit's holding was to
counter the determination by the Court of Federal Claims on the first
factor, finding a lack of transformative purpose or character.15 9 The
Federal Circuit found that the non-transformative stamp generated an
estimated $5.4 million in revenue, so the commercial nature of the
stamp caused the first factor to weigh "strongly against" a finding of
fair use.160 The Federal Circuit further found that the third factor
weighed against fair use because the stamp depicted fourteen of
nineteen soldiers and clearly represented The Column.161 The fourth
factor weighed in favor of fair use, as the stamp was not likely to
adversely impact a market for derivative works of The Column.162
155. Id. at 10-12.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
158. Id. at 1373-75.
159. Id. at 1372. The Court of Federal Claims found that the postage stamp was fair use
because it transformed The Column. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that "the stamp and
The Column share a common purpose: to honor veterans of the Korean War." Id. at 1373.
Additionally, to the extent there is a transformation, the argument that the stamp transforms
The Column is misplaced; if anything, the underlying photograph transforms The Column, but
the stamp does nothing to transform the photograph.
160. Id. at 1370-71.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1375.
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This left analysis of the second factor. Following the creativity
and publication inquiries, the Federal Circuit followed the Court of
Federal Claims in declaring the work both creative and published.163
The Federal Circuit justified its decision by noting the uniquely public
nature of national monuments: "Although The Column is part of a
national monument-perhaps the epitome of a published work-given
the overall creative and expressive nature of the work, we conclude
that this factor weighs against fair use."16
If, however, the Court had considered the intent of the author
for the published work, perhaps the balance would have changed.
Including the public nature of the copyrighted work in the analysis
would have likely shifted the balance of the second factor to weigh in
favor of fair use. As a result, two factors would have favored fair use,
and two factors would have weighed against it. Although one cannot
predict with certainty that the outcome of the case would have
changed, the scrutiny of the factors would have made the fair use
decision much closer.
The unpredictability of adding authorial intent into the second
factor is both its strongest and weakest point. Incorporating intent
would create a higher level of subjectivity for that factor; it takes little
analysis to determine whether a work is factual or published. A more
nuanced analysis of this factor would elevate "the nature of the
copyrighted work" to a level of significance and thoughtfulness
comparable to what the other three factors require. An intent inquiry
also allows for the determination of whether a work belongs in the
public domain, or whether a subsequent use of the work constitutes an
infringement, on a case-by-case basis. Considering each potential
infringement individually would allow a court to decide whether to
penalize a significantly commercial use of a copyrighted public work.
The Gaylord court may still have found the highly profitable stamp
not fair use. But, it still would have considered the nature of the
copyrighted work in a way that acknowledged its intended use.
On the other hand, the unpredictability might also be
problematic. By considering the public nature of a work only at the
fair use inquiry, it leaves second-comers uncertain as to whether an
anticipated use would in fact infringe. Moreover, leaving an intent
inquiry or the public nature of a work to fair use fails to automatically
enter works into the public domain, if that is indeed the goal. A case-
by-case analysis means that a work could be public in nature, but
163. Id. at 1374.




would lack the same certainty as if the work were in "the public
domain."
IV. MORAL RIGHTS OBSTACLES TO PUBLIC WORKS
While in theory public works of authorship seem like a
harmless genre of authored works to carve out for the public domain,
bypassing copyright altogether may not be possible. The primary
obstacle is the existence of moral rights on a national and
international level that might prevent copyright regimes from
reserving rights to the public.
A. VARA
As mentioned above, authors of public works currently also
enjoy rights under the VARA, 165 the vehicle by which Congress
incorporated moral rights into the U.S. Copyright Act to meet the
Berne Convention standards. 166 Moral rights allow the creator "to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation."1 6 7 In the United States, the right "to claim authorship"
has been interpreted as the right of attribution, and the right "to
object" to that prejudicial action has been interpreted as the right of
integrity.168 Regardless of the function of a work, "[tihe entitlement of
an author to be correctly attributed, to have some control over the
integrity of his work, seems important."169
Even if a work directly enters the public domain, VARA may
still apply. According to § 106A(b), "[o]nly the author of a work of
visual art has the rights [of attribution and integrity] in that work,
whether or not the author is the copyright owner." 70 VARA rights are
165. See 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(1)-(2) (2011) ("[Tjhe author of a work of visual art shall have
the right to claim authorship of that work, and to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create; shall have the right to prevent
the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation.").
166. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing
VARA's relationship with the Berne Convention).
167. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept.
9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 29, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://
zvon.org/law/r/bern.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
169. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 29
(Yale Univ. Press 2008).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
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not the rights conferred by § 106 of the Copyright Act; they attach only
to works of visual art and last only for the life of the author,
emphasizing their personal nature.171 Moreover, VARA itself specifies
that the rights are independent of the rights conferred by § 106.172
Though it predates the adoption of VARA in 1990, Serra v. U.S.
General Services Administration dealt with an artist commissioned to
create a sculpture for the federal government. 173 In Serra, the U.S.
General Services Administration (GSA) commissioned Richard Serra
to create a sculpture for the plaza adjacent to the federal office
complex in lower Manhattan.174 Serra created Tilted Arc for $175,000
and signed a contract providing that "'all designs, sketches, models,
and the work produced under this Agreement ... shall be the property
of [the United States]."'175 The contract said nothing about the
Government's post-purchase use of the sculpture. 76 After years of
intense criticism over Tilted Arc, the GSA recommended that it be
relocated.' 77 Serra sued, and the Second Circuit eventually heard his
claims of free expression and due process. 78 The Court found that if
any party could claim freedom of speech, it was the U.S. government:
Serra relinquished his own speech rights in the sculpture when he voluntarily sold it to
GSA; if he wished to retain some degree of control as to the duration and location of the
display of his work, he had the opportunity to bargain for such rights in making the
contract for sale of his work.1 7 9
The Court also did not accept the claims that the work was
site-specific, and would be destroyed if it were moved, noting,
"Notwithstanding that the sculpture is site-specific and may lose its
artistic value if relocated, Serra is free to express his artistic and
political views through other means."180  While recognizing the
171. See id. § 106A(d)(1).
172. See id. § 106A(a). The only other specific mention of § 106A in the Copyright Act is
under § 113, which deals specifically with "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works." Id. § 113.
However, the provisions which encompass or exempt § 106A rights from application are tied
directly to a work of visual art that was made part of a building, removing the work from moral
rights if the building needs to be taken down. See id. § 113(d).
173. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 1046-47.
175. Id. at 1047. The excerpt that Serra provides does not state whether copyright and
intellectual property rights were expressly included in the contract.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1048. Interestingly, Serra had initially filed for copyright infringement, but
the District Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the same provision that did not apply in Gaylord,
created a subject-matter jurisdiction bar against his suit. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
667 F. Supp. 1042, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims is the only
court that could hear claims of copyright infringement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
179. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1049.
180. Id. at 1050.
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importance of Serra's message, the Second Circuit found the U.S.
government's patronage of the arts just as important:
We recognize that courts considering First Amendment challenges by artists to
governmental decisions to remove purchased works of art must proceed with some
caution, lest a removal ostensibly based on unsuitable physical characteristics of the
work or an unfavorable assessment of its aesthetic appeal camouflage an impermissible
condemnation of political viewpoint. At the same time, artists must recognize that
overly intrusive judicial restraints upon the prerogatives of government to decide when,
where, and whether to display works of art that it has purchased would pose a serious
threat to the vigor of such commendable ventures as GSA's art-in-architecture program.
Government can be a significant patron of the arts. Its incentive to fulfill that role must
not be dampened by unwarranted restrictions on its freedom to decide what to do with
art it has purchased.1 8 1
Moreover, the Court held that even if Serra had suffered damage to
his reputation, it did not amount to a lost property interest that could
amount to a due process violation.182
While not itself a moral rights case, Serra dealt with issues of
prejudice and loss to reputation, providing a foundation for later cases
decided under VARA. 183 Serra serves as an example that works
created for the federal government as monuments and memorials are
not simultaneously subject to VARA, despite the personal nature of
the rights involved.
B. Berne Convention
If Congress decides to exempt public works from copyright
protection, it must consider whether such an exemption complies with
the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, the international agreement that the United
States formally joined in 1988.184 Created in 1886, the Berne
Convention sought "to help nationals of its member States obtain
international protection of their right to control, and receive payment
for, the use of their creative works." 185  The Berne Convention
specifically protects sculpture as an artistic work.186 In addition to
copyrights, the Convention protects moral rights in works of
expression.187 It requires that member States comply with its
181. Id. at 1051 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 1052 ("[Sluch an injury without loss of government employment would not
constitute a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of property or liberty.").
183. See, e.g., Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006).
184. Berne Convention, supra note 167.
185. WIPO Treaties - General Information, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
general (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
186. Berne Convention, supra note 167, at art. 2(1) (including as an "artistic work"
"works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography").
187. Id. at art. 6bis.
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provisions to receive reciprocal rights from other members. 88
Members must extend protection to benefit "the author and his
successors in title."89
The Convention does recognize exceptions to the protections
that it offers, similar to the ones recognized in the United States. For
example, member nations may determine the level of protection
granted to "official texts of a legislative, administrative, and legal
nature,"90 justifying the nonprotection of "works of the United States
government" under § 105. The same justification could apply to the
Convention provision permitting exclusions for political speeches and
legal proceedings.191 It is unclear, however, whether the "public"
nature of the Berne Convention exceptions would also extend to
monuments or memorials, since sculpture is one class of works
specifically identified as protectable under Berne. Additionally, Berne
may preclude Congress from reclassifying public memorials as works
of architecture, since the Convention expressly extends to works of
architecture as well.192
However, according to a recent report by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), the implementing body of the Berne
Convention: "States are also free to invoke other public interest
motives to exclude some creations from protection and place them in
the public domain." 93 For example, the report notes that Chile "puts
into the public domain works that have been expropriated by the
State," though it notes that there seems to be "no case of application of
such provision to creative works so far."194 This does appear to provide
an "out" to any member State that can offer a public policy reason that
a work should automatically enter into the public domain. This
workaround might also apply to any sui generis type of legislation
outside copyright extended to public works; once copyright is not an
issue, the Berne Convention may cease to pose a problem. For
example, Egypt has been a member of the Berne Convention since
1977,195 yet its Antiquities Law appears not to run afoul of it. This,
however, may be because the law offers protections greater than that
188. Id. at art. 3(1).
189. Id. at art. 2(6).
190. Id. at art. 2(4).
191. Id. at art. 2bis(1).
192. Id. at art. 4(b).
193. SEVERINE DUSOLLIER, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., SCOPING STUDY ON
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 30 (2010), available at http://www.
wipo.intledocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip 4_3_revstudy-inf 1.pdf.
194. Id. Moreover, the report notes that the article reflects the spirit of a Socialist Chile
when it was enacted, and "expropriations for public interest were a political strategy." Id.
195. Treaties and Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.
jsp?cnty-id=946C (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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required by the Convention, which it allows member States to
provide. 96 When a law attempts to take rights away from those
already afforded, the Berne Convention may still provide an obstacle.
The one solution that the Berne Convention would not prohibit,
and would in fact condone, would be the reinterpretation of fair use:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the
extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such
utilization is compatible with fair practice.
1 9 7
This provision does not encompass all uses that could be
subsequently deemed fair. However, this interpretation of fair use
also excludes many uses currently considered fair, so WIPO may have
left this up to individual member States to interpret. Finally, the
WIPO report also notes the voluntary entry of expressions into the
public domain, where authors choose to put their works into the public
domain.198 The report posits that a regime allowing authors to
relinquish copyright should be precisely written, and is not without its
own drawbacks:
Even if one admits this relinquishment, it should be recalled that the work now
abandoned to the public domain is not protected against any attempt at appropriation.
Once the work is in the public domain, it will be subject to its regime of free use, which
can open the possibility for others, with only small but original adaptations, to exploit
the new work and gain exclusivity and revenue out of it. This can explain that some
authors, wishing to allow the public to benefit from open access to and free enjoyment of
their creation, might prefer having recourse to less radical licenses granting such
freedoms, while retaining some control, over relinquishing their copyright altogether.
1 9 9
V. CONCLUSION
If any discrete, ordinarily copyrightable category of works could
arguably be works intended to be in the public domain from creation,
it would be public memorials. These works, meant to remind us of
people and events upon which we built the country, are essentially
public. As such, private rights in ownership, and the ability to profit
from those private rights, seem contrary to the original intent of the
work. The default, however, is to grant private ownership rights for
individual works of expression, not to create reasons for them not to be
in the public domain. As a result, regardless of the public nature of
196. Berne Convention, supra note 167, at art. 19 ("The provisions of this Convention
shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may be
granted by legislation in a country of the Union.").
197. Id. at art. 10(2).
198. DUSOLLIER, supra note 193 at 33.
199. Id. at 35.
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certain expressive works, the author can monopolize any future uses.
If Congress and the courts do nothing, authors of public artistic works
will continue to receive rights to monopolize derivative works. The
public, on the other hand, loses the ability to use the works as a part
of its culture, and to deepen its collective education and history. Not
every American can see the Korean War Memorial firsthand in
Washington, D.C., but the USPS sold forty-eight million stamps
depicting The Column, bringing that heritage to Americans
nationwide. 200
Professor James Boyle explains that the First Amendment does
not only capture Americans' rights to freedom of the press, of
assembly, of religion, of speech. 201 If the First Amendment offers
freedom of speech, it necessarily entails the freedom to hear. 202 If the
First Amendment gives the freedom of the press, it also gives the
freedom to read, and to learn.203  These freedoms-the implied
freedoms that the First Amendment offers the American public-are
what the public domain is intended to safeguard. 204 Ultimately, it
makes sense to expand the public domain with works that are
targeted for the American public.
The treatment of public artistic works could serve as a
prototype for other types of works that the authors release into the
public for the public's benefit and only try to claim rights in them once
they learn that the works could be profitable. Social networking
provides another forum where information may have originally
intended to be for public consumption, but then curtailed by the
author's rights. "The fundamental currency among users of social
networking services is shared information; the greater the perceived
value of the information, the higher the status of the user."205 For
Twitter users, a standard of success is the number of times a user's
post, or "tweet," is reposted, or "retweeted."206 But the content is still
the author's, both under copyright law and under the Twitter terms of
service. In at least one case, whether the redistribution of a tweeted
photograph is a violation of copyright law is still at issue.207
200. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010).




205. Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Claims to Images Posted on Twitter, LAW.COM
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=
1202478390584.
206. Id.
207. See Agence France Presse v. Morel, No. 10 Civ. 2730 (WHP), 2011 WL 147718, at
*32 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2011) (refusing to dismiss claims of copyright infringement of Tweeted
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Comments one author, "It is interesting . .. to consider how the
decision plays out against the expectations of typical Twitter users
and the social networking economy generally."208 For decades, the
expectations of the public have gone ignored with respect to acceptable
uses of copyrighted information. The memorials may lead the way to
a new thinking of intended-for-public information-or, quite possibly,
the new expectations will provide a template for the memorials to
follow.
photos of the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake based on secondary liability and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
208. Kramarsky, supra note 205.
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